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A MATTER OF GOOD FORM: THE
(DOWNSIZED) HAGUE JUDGMENTS
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VALIDITY FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF
FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS
JASON WEBB YACKEE
INTRODUCTION
Can the Hague Judgments Convention be saved through radical
downsizing? It has been more than ten years since the Hague
Conference on Private International Law (Hague Conference) first
officially began exploring the possibility of drafting a global
convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of foreign judgments
in civil and commercial matters.1 It has been more than four years
since the Conference presented its preliminary draft convention,2
itself modeled largely on the European Community’s 1968 Brussels
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters (Brussels I).3 However, this
Copyright © 2003 by Jason Webb Yackee.
1. The Hague Conference is a permanent intergovernmental organization that seeks to
unify international private law through the negotiation and drafting of multilateral treaties. The
Hague Conference website is at http://www.hcch.net (last visited December 16, 2003).
2. PRELIMINARY DRAFT CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN
CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS (adopted Oct. 30, 1999), at http://www.hcch.net/e/
conventions/draft36e.html (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
3. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32, 8 I.L.M. 229 (1969), reprinted as
amended and consolidated in 1998 O.J. (C 27) 1 [hereinafter Brussels I]. Brussels I provides
detailed rules governing the jurisdiction of European national courts in a variety of tort,
contract, and other situations. Id. arts. 2–15. Brussels I also provides rules for the recognition
and enforcement of European judgments within the European Community (EC). Id. arts. 25–49.
EC member states also entered into a nearly identical convention with the members of the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9, 28 I.L.M. 620
(1989) [hereinafter Lugano Convention].
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preliminary draft convention was rejected as unacceptable by the
American delegation,4 and a subsequent “interim text”5 indicated that
Hague Conference delegates remained far from consensus on a wide
range of issues.6
In the hopes of salvaging a portion of this decade of work, a
Hague Conference informal working group recently proposed turning
the draft convention’s provisions on business-to-business (B2B)
forum selection agreements (FSAs) into a stand-alone international
“choice of court” convention.7 Such a convention would at least
For all of the EC member states besides Denmark, Brussels I, an international treaty, has
been largely supplanted by an instrument of EC law: Council Regulation 44/2001 of 22
December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 [hereinafter Brussels II]. For discussions of the
relationship between Brussels I and Brussels II, see generally HÉLÈNE GAUDEMET-TALLON,
COMPÉTENCE ET EXÉCUTION DES JUGEMENTS EN EUROPE (2002), and Georges A.L. Droz &
Hélène Gaudemet-Tallon, La transformation de Bruxelles du 27 septembre 1968 en Réglement
du Conseil concernant la compétence judiciare, la reconnaissance et l’exécution des décisions en
matière civile et commerciale, 90 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ
[R.C.D.I.P.] 601 (2001).
4. For a discussion of the United States’s criticisms of the preliminary draft convention,
see Arthur T. Von Mehren, Drafting a Convention on International Jurisdiction and the Effects
of Foreign Judgments Acceptable World-Wide: Can the Hague Conference Project Succeed?, 49
AM. J. COMP. L. 191, 192 (2001) (“The United States delegation believed, for example, that the
Conference’s traditional diplomatic session procedures, with their strong majoritarian bias, were
incapable of producing a convention that would be acceptable world-wide.”).
5. Summary of the Outcome of the Discussion in Commission II of the First Part of the
Diplomatic Conference, 6–20 June 2001, Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Nineteenth Session art. 6, at http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html
(last visited December 16, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
6. Those issues included, inter alia, the proper bases of jurisdiction in contract disputes, id.
art. 6 n.33; the enumeration of prohibited bases of jurisdiction generally, id. art. 18 n.104; and
jurisdictional rules for electronic commerce transactions. See Mary Shannon Martin, Note, Keep
It Online: The Hague Convention and the Need for Online Alternative Dispute Resolution in
International Business-to-Consumer E-Commerce, 20 B.U. INT’L L.J. 125, 127 (2002) (noting
that unanticipated e-commerce jurisdictional issues risked making the convention “outdated by
the time it was concluded”).
7. For the Hague Conference’s preliminary documents concerning the potential FSA
convention, see Avril D. Haines, Choice of Court Agreements in International Litigation: Their
Use and Legal Problems to Which They Give Rise in the Context of the Interim Text, Hague
Conference on Private International Law Preliminary Document No. 18 (Feb. 2002); Andrea
Schulz, Reflection Paper to Assist in the Preparation of a Convention on Jurisdiction and
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Hague
Conference on Private International Law Preliminary Document No. 19 (Aug. 2002); Andrea
Schulz, Report on the First Meeting of the Informal Working Group on the Judgments Project—
October 22–25, 2002, Hague Conference on Private International Law Preliminary Document
No. 20 (Nov. 2002); Andrea Schulz, Report on the Second Meeting of the Informal Working
Group on the Judgments Project—January 6–9, 2003, Hague Conference on Private
International Law Preliminary Document No. 21 (Jan. 2003); Andrea Schulz, Report on the
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partially supplant current national and state laws that may unduly
restrict the enforceability of private agreements that grant a given
court or courts exclusive jurisdiction over future contractual disputes.8
Although an FSA convention is clearly a less ambitious project than
the Judgments Convention originally anticipated, the need for such a
Convention in international commerce is real.9 For example, although
national courts generally freely enforce international arbitration
agreements, many of those same courts are more hesitant to enforce
equivalent FSAs.10 This hesitation is especially curious because FSAs
serve the same purpose as international arbitration agreements—they
allow the parties to a contract to reduce, if not to eliminate, the risk of
being hauled before an unknown and inconvenient court that would
apply unfamiliar or unfavorable laws. Indeed, forum selection and
arbitration agreements differ only in one respect: the former
designate public forums, while the latter designate private forums. As
scholars on both sides of the Atlantic have suggested, and as the
United States Supreme Court has implied, this difference should not
justify different standards of enforcement.11
Work of the Informal Working Group on the Judgments Project, in Particular on the Preliminary
Text Achieved at Its Third Meeting—25–28 March 2003, Hague Conference on Private
International Law Preliminary Document No. 22 (June 2003) [hereinafter Schulz, Preliminary
Document No. 22]. All of these documents are at http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html
(last visited December 16, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
8. For example, under Belgian law, certain FSAs are enforced only if they are drafted in
Dutch. Haines, supra note 7, at 10–11. Iowa state courts refuse to enforce “outbound” FSAs
that deprive Iowa courts of jurisdiction. See Davenport Mach. & Foundry Co. v. Adolph Coors
Co., 314 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Iowa 1982) (“[W]e hold that clauses purporting to deprive Iowa
courts of jurisdiction they would otherwise have are not legally binding in Iowa.”).
9. Professor William Park suggested the need for, and the possibility of, such a convention
several years ago. See WILLIAM W. PARK, INTERNATIONAL FORUM SELECTION 17–19 (1995).
10. See, e.g., CATHERINE BLANCHIN, L’AUTONOMIE DE LA CLAUSE COMPROMISSOIRE: UN
MODÈLE POUR LA CLAUSE ATTRIBUTIVE DE JURIDICTION? 1 (1995) (noting that although
under French law arbitration clauses have become “virtually unattackable,” French judges
remain relatively wary of FSAs); PARK, supra note 9, at 17–20 (noting that under U.S. law, the
enforcement of FSAs, unlike arbitration agreements, is subject to considerable uncertainty);
William W. Park, Bridging the Gap in Forum Selection: Harmonizing Arbitration and Court
Selection, 8 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 19–22 (1998) (discussing the “growing
disjunction between arbitration and court selection” clauses).
11. See generally Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 534
(1995) (noting that international arbitration agreements “are but a subset of foreign [FSAs] in
general”); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974) (“An agreement to arbitrate
before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection clause that posits
not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute.”);
BLANCHIN, supra note 10 (analyzing the attitudes of French courts to arbitration and forum
selection agreements); NATHALIE COIPEL-CORDONNIER, LES CONVENTIONS D’ARBITRAGE ET
D’ÉLECTION DE FOR EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ (1999) (outlining the similarities and
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This Note analyzes one area of the current “choice of court”
proposal that has received little critical attention by Hague
Conference delegates: conditions of formal validity.12 Conditions of
formal validity encompass specific, tangible, external manifestations
of consent to an FSA, or to the content of that agreement, in the
absence of which the seised court13 will refuse enforcement.14 These
conditions may include rigid standards of proof involving the
necessity and content of a “writing” containing or evidencing the
FSA.15 Such conditions are designed to assure that the parties have
actually consented to a given FSA.
Current Hague Conference proposals incorporate provisions on
formal validity that largely mirror provisions in the European
Community’s 1968 Brussels Convention16 and its successor
instrument, Council Regulation 44/2001 (Brussels II).17 As such, this
Note argues that by replicating those provisions, Conference
differences between arbitration agreements and FSAs); PARK, supra note 9, at 177 (arguing for
jurisdiction clauses to have similar force as arbitration agreements). This relative hostility to
FSAs is unfortunate because it has the potential to distort private legal decisionmaking by
encouraging parties to submit contractually their future disputes to arbitration even when they
would prefer on substantive grounds to submit those disputes to a specific public forum.
12. For example, the Hague Conference informal working group’s last report on the
interim text for the choice of court convention spends only three paragraphs discussing the
interim text’s formal validity provisions. The report notes that there is “only” one issue upon
which members of the working group “may” have “different views”—“whether the chosen court
will be allowed to accept a clause valid only under its national law.” Schulz, Preliminary
Document No. 22, supra note 7, at 15. The report suggests that these concerns may be moot
because “such a case was unlikely to arise in practice.” Id.
13. As used in this Note, a court is “seised” when one party to a dispute formally asks that
court to exercise jurisdiction over the dispute.
14. For a similar definition, see Mario Giuliano & Paul Lagarde, Report on the Convention
on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 1980 O.J. (C 282) 1, 29. See also PIERRE
MAYER & VINCENT HEUZÉ, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 506 (2001) (“A requirement
relating to the validity of a legal act is formal when the requirement involves only external
manifestations of behavior by those who participate in the formation of the act.”) (author’s
translation; all subsequent translations are the author’s unless otherwise indicated). As used in
this Note, a seised court “enforces” an FSA in one of two circumstances: (a) the seised court
refuses to exercise jurisdiction over the dispute on the ground that an FSA grants exclusive
jurisdiction to another court, or (b) a seised court accepts jurisdiction on the grounds that an
FSA grants jurisdiction to the seised court itself.
15. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 199 cmt. b (1971)
(discussing “Requirements of a Writing—Formalities,” and noting that “[t]he rule of this
Section applies to such questions as whether a contract must be in writing, or evidenced by a
writing, in order to be valid and enforceable, and, if so, what the form of the writing must be,
whether it must be signed [or notarized]”).
16. Brussels I, supra note 3, art. 17.
17. Brussels II, supra note 3, art. 23.
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delegates are close to repeating one of the fundamental mistakes of
the preliminary draft judgments convention: an overreliance on a
European legal text that is a “thoroughly inappropriate model” for a
“world-wide convention.”18
In arguing for an FSA convention that goes beyond current
proposals, this Note proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the United
States and European Union FSA regimes, emphasizing in particular
the extent to which United States and European Union law generally
admit that B2B FSAs are enforceable. Part II analyzes the conditions
of formal validity that the European Union regime imposes,
comparing those conditions to formal conditions imposed under
United States law. Part III concludes the Note by proposing original
model provisions on formal validity that emphasize flexibility of form
and the primacy of party consent.
As one scholar of private international law has argued, the
“greatest utility” of the comparative analysis of conflict-of-law
regimes lies in “enlightened rulemaking” that promotes the
“international unification of law.”19 The analysis below is intended to
provide the building blocks for an “enlightened unification” of
current FSA law, which unfortunately remains a complex
hodgepodge of international, national, and subnational legal regimes
that too often ignore the informed jurisdictional choices of
commercial actors.
I.  A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF UNITED STATES
AND EUROPEAN UNION FSA REGIMES: A SHARED ACCEPTANCE
OF FSA ENFORCEABILITY
Both United States and European law accept that FSAs should
generally be enforced if various conditions of formal validity are met.
Section A briefly discusses the principal foundation of modern
United States FSA law—the seminal case of Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co.20 The Section also discusses the extent to which Bremen’s
18. Von Mehren, supra note 4, at 196–97. Professor Von Mehren discusses the failure of
the Hague Judgments Convention negotiations generally, and notes that the failure was due in
large part to a “fundamental discordance between the views of the United States and of most,
perhaps all, European Union States respecting the role of adjudication in contemporary
society.” Id. at 195.
19. Mathias Reimann, Parochialism in American Conflicts Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 369,
379 (2001).
20. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
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pro-FSA holding may supplant state FSA law. Section B introduces
the principal source of FSA law in the European Union—Council
Regulation 44/2001.
A. United States FSA Law Generally: Bremen and Its Legacy
In the United States, FSA laws are of jurisprudential origin.21
Prior to 1972, that jurisprudence routinely refused to recognize the
enforceability of FSAs on the grounds that such agreements violated
an abstract “public policy” by impermissibly “ousting” the jurisdiction
of the courts.22 In a remarkable reversal of this case law, the Supreme
Court announced in Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.23 that in most
circumstances FSAs were henceforth “prima facie valid.”24 Since the
Bremen decision, federal courts have only rarely refused to enforce
FSAs in international B2B contracts.25
21. See Park, supra note 10, at 23–25 (discussing the absence of statutes or international
conventions governing FSA enforcement under United States law). However, at least one
federal court has applied the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 59, 19 I.L.M. 671 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1988),
to determine the validity of an FSA. See Chateau des Charmes Wines Ltd. v. Sabate USA Inc.,
328 F.3d 528, 530 (9th Cir. 2003).
22. For a brief historical discussion of pre-Bremen ouster doctrine and its demise, see
David H. Taylor, The Forum Selection Clause: A Tale of Two Concepts, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 785,
794–99 (1993).
23. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
24. Id. at 10. Bremen involved an international towage contract between an American
drilling corporation, Zapata, and a German towing corporation. Id. at 2. The contract contained
an FSA conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the “London Court of Justice.” Id. During towage
from the Gulf of Mexico to the Adriatic Sea, Zapata’s ocean-going oilrig was damaged in
international waters. Id. Zapata ignored the FSA and commenced suit in United States district
court. Id. at 3–4. The district court refused to enforce the FSA, even though the London Court
of Justice itself had ruled that the FSA was enforceable. Id. at 3–8. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the lower court’s refusal to enforce the
FSA, stating that FSAs “will not be enforced unless the selected state would provide a more
convenient forum than the state in which suit is brought.” Id. at 7 (quoting in re Unterweser
Reederei, GMBH, 428 F.2d 888, 894 (5th Cir. 1970)). The United States Supreme Court
reversed, holding that FSAs were “prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement
is shown by the resisting party to be ‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.” Id. at 10.
25. For two rare cases of nonenforcement of international FSAs by federal courts, see
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 758 F.2d 341, 345–46 (8th Cir. 1985)
(refusing to enforce an FSA specifying an Iranian forum and noting the lack of diplomatic ties
between the United States and Iran, Iran’s war with Iraq, and that the suspension of major
commercial flights to Iran would effectively deny the American company its day in court), and
Copperweld Steel Co. v. Demag-Mannesmann-Bohler, 578 F.2d 953, 965 & n.18 (3d Cir. 1978)
(refusing to enforce as unreasonable an FSA specifying a German forum on the ground that all
of the evidence and activities relating to the dispute were in the United States). However,
Copperweld may no longer represent good law in the Third Circuit; subsequent decisions have
YACKEE.DOC 07/07/04  1:40 PM
2003] A MATTER OF GOOD FORM 1185
Bremen was decided under federal admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction,26 and its holding does not necessarily apply to federal
courts exercising federal question jurisdiction.27 However, federal
courts routinely apply Bremen’s holding to enforce FSAs in federal
question cases.28 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself appears to have
applied Bremen to federal question cases involving the enforceability
of international arbitration clauses. For example, in Scherck v.
Alberto-Culver Co.,29 the Court cited Bremen to justify enforcing an
arbitration agreement in a sales contract between a German seller
and an American buyer that specified a French arbitral forum.30
Eleven years later, the Court cited Bremen extensively to justify
enforcing an arbitration agreement specifying a Japanese forum even
though the (American) party seeking to escape the agreement had
consistently enforced similar FSAs in domestic and international contracts. See, e.g.,
Instrumentation Assocs., Inc. v. Madsen Elecs. (Canada) Ltd., 859 F.2d 4, 9 (3d Cir. 1988)
(“Any jurisdiction whose law could properly apply to this case would enforce the parties’ choice
of a Canadian forum to settle their disputes ‘in connection’ with this contract.”); Diaz
Contracting, Inc. v. Nanco Contracting Corp., 817 F.2d 1047, 1052–53 (3d Cir. 1987) (enforcing
an FSA on the ground that although the plaintiff had “arguably demonstrated some
inconvenience in litigating in the contractual forum, its assertions are insufficient to meet its
heavy burden of proving unreasonableness and injustice” required under the Bremen standard
(footnote omitted)); Gen. Eng’g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352, 360 (3d
Cir. 1986) (enforcing an FSA because it “was freely bargained for and does not contravene an
important public policy”).
26. The Supreme Court emphasized that “[w]e believe this [rule of prima facie validity] is
the correct doctrine to be followed by federal district courts sitting in admiralty.” Bremen, 407
U.S. at 10 (emphasis added). The United States Constitution vests the federal courts with
subject matter jurisdiction over “all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.” U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
27. The United States Constitution authorizes federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over
disputes involving questions of federal law: “The [federal] judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
This “federal question” basis of jurisdiction is distinct from the Constitution’s grant of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction to the federal courts. 2 AM. JUR. 2D Admiralty § 5 (1994).
28. Young Lee, Note, Forum Selection Clauses: Problems of Enforcement in Diversity
Cases and State Courts, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 663, 668 & n.22 (1997); see also Lipcon v.
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 1998) (applying Bremen to a
dispute concerning federal securities law); Richards v. Lloyd’s of London, 135 F.3d 1289, 1293
(9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (same); Haynsworth v. The Corp., 121 F.3d 956, 963 (5th Cir. 1997)
(same); Allen v. Lloyd’s of London, 94 F.3d 923, 928 (4th Cir. 1996) (same); Roby v. Corp. of
Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353, 1361 (2d Cir. 1993) (same); Bonny v. Soc’y of Lloyd’s, 3 F.3d 156, 159
(7th Cir. 1992) (same); Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 958 (10th
Cir. 1992) (same).
29. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
30. Id. at 508, 518–19.
YACKEE.DOC 07/07/04  1:40 PM
1186 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:1179
raised statutory antitrust claims under the Sherman Act.31 As such,
although the Supreme Court has yet to rule explicitly on the matter, it
seems reasonably clear that Bremen is binding on federal question
cases.32
Although Bremen appears to control federal courts exercising
federal question jurisdiction, Bremen, as federal common law, does
not control most state court proceedings.33 As such, state FSA
lawtraditionally hostile to FSAsremains relevant. Even though
state courts have increasingly abandoned their traditional hostility,
state law remains in many cases less favorable to FSA enforcement
than the Bremen standard. For example, only twenty-five state
supreme courts have explicitly adopted or favorably cited the Bremen
decision as expressing state law.34 Moreover, only eight other state
supreme courts have indicated, without citing Bremen, that FSAs are
31. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629–31 (1985).
32. See Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 18 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that Bremen’s holding
“has been extended in this and other circuits to diversity and other non-admiralty cases”).
33. See, e.g., Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that federal law
does not preempt state law absent “clear Congressional intent to preempt”). However, Bremen
probably controls state court proceedings involving admiralty matters. Sun World Lines, Ltd. v.
March Shipping Corp., 801 F.2d 1066, 1068 (8th Cir. 1986) (noting that federal admiralty law
controls state law when there is a direct conflict between the two); 2 AM. JUR. 2D Admiralty § 7
(1994).
34. See Prof’l Ins. Corp. v. Sutherland, 700 So. 2d 347, 350 (Ala. 1997); Abadou v. Trad, 624
P.2d 287, 290 (Alaska 1981); Societe Jean Nicolas et Fils v. Mousseux, 597 P.2d 541, 542–43
(Ariz. 1979); Nelms v. Morgan Portable Bldg. Corp., 808 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Ark. 1991); Smith,
Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, 551 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Cal. 1976); United States Trust
Co. v. Bohart, 495 A.2d 1034, 1040 (Conn. 1985); Manrique v. Fabbri, 493 So. 2d 437, 440 (Fla.
1986); Vanier v. Ponsoldt, 833 P.2d 949, 958–59 (Kan. 1992); Lejano v. Bandak, 705 So. 2d 158,
166–67 (La. 1997); Gilman v. Wheat, First Sec. Inc., 692 A.2d 454, 462 (Md. 1997); Cambridge
Biotech Corp. v. Pasteur Sanofi Diagnostics, 740 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Mass. 2000); Hauenstein &
Bermeister, Inc. v. Met-Fab Indus., Inc., 320 N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn. 1982); Tel-Com Mgmt.,
Inc. v. Waveland Resort Inns, Inc., 782 So. 2d 149, 151–52 (Miss. 2001); High Life Sales Co. v.
Brown-Forman Corp., 823 S.W.2d 493, 496–97 (Mo. 1992) (en banc); Strafford Tech., Inc. v.
Camcar Div. of Textron, Inc., 784 A.2d 1198, 1201 (N.H. 2001); Kubis & Perszyk Assocs. v. Sun
Microsystems, 680 A.2d 618, 624 (N.J. 1996); Brooke Group Ltd. v. JCH Syndicate 488, 663
N.E.2d 635, 637 (N.Y. 1996); Perkins v. CCH Computax, Inc., 423 S.E.2d 780, 782 (N.C. 1992);
Kennecorp Mortgage Brokers, Inc. v. Country Club Convalescent Hosp., Inc., 610 N.E.2d 987,
989 (Ohio 1993); Tateosian v. Celebrity Cruise Servs. Ltd., 768 A.2d 1248, 1250–52 (R.I. 2001);
Prows v. Pinpoint Retail Sys., Inc., 868 P.2d 809, 811–12 (Utah 1993); Chase Commercial Corp.
v. Barton, 571 A.2d 682, 684 (Vt. 1990); Paul Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 397 S.E.2d
804, 807 (Va. 1990); Cannelton Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co, 460 S.E.2d 1, 15 (W. Va.
1994) (citing Bremen favorably, but finding that Bremen did not apply to the service of suit
clause at issue); Durdahl v. Nat’l Safety Assocs., 988 P.2d 525, 527 (Wyo. 1999). Technically, the
Bremen decision does not control state law outside of admiralty and maritime disputes.
However, these state supreme court decisions indicate that Bremen has considerable persuasive
authority.
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prima facie enforceable.35 These latter decisions rely in many cases on
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which embraces FSAs
with less enthusiasm than did the Bremen court.36 Other state laws are
much less favorable to FSAs. For example, Illinois courts, while citing
Bremen favorably, nonetheless continue to refuse to enforce FSAs
contained in form contracts.37 The Tennessee Supreme Court has
likewise cited Bremen favorably, only to apply the case strictly to
refuse enforcement.38 Iowa continues to hold outbound FSAs to be
prima facie unenforceable.39 Michigan courts will not enforce inbound
“venue” selection agreements,40 and Montana courts will not enforce
35. The following are state supreme court decisions for recognizing and enforcing FSAs:
Clinic Masters, Inc. v. District Court, 556 P.2d 473, 475 (Colo. 1976); Elf Atochem North
America, Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 292 (Del. 1999); Prezocki v. Bullock Garages, Inc., 938
S.W.2d 888, 889 (Ky. 1997); Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Society v. Yelich, 549 N.W.2d
172, 175 (Neb. 1996); Triple Quest, Inc. v. Cleveland Gear Co., 627 N.W.2d 379, 385 (N.D. 2001)
(applying Ohio law); Reeves v. Chem Industrial Co., 495 P.2d 729, 731–32 (Or. 1972); Central
Contracting Co. v. C.E. Youngdahl & Co., 209 A.2d 810, 816 (Pa. 1965); and Klenz v. AVI
International, 647 N.W.2d 734, 738 (S.D. 2002).
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 (1971) establishes that “[t]he
parties’ agreement as to the place of the action cannot oust a state of judicial jurisdiction, but
such an agreement will be given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable.”
37. See Williams v. Ill. State Scholarship Comm’n., 563 N.E.2d 465, 486–87 (Ill. 1990)
(citing Bremen, but refusing to enforce an FSA on the grounds that the FSA violated the
“public policy” expressed in the Illinois venue statute and that the FSA was contained in non-
negotiated “boilerplate”). Lower Illinois courts have similarly applied Bremen strictly to
invalidate FSAs. See, e.g., Mellon First United Leasing v. Hansen, 705 N.E.2d 121, 125–26 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1998) (citing Bremen, but refusing to enforce an FSA on the ground that it was
“boilerplate language in small print on the back of a preprinted form” that was “like an
adhesion contract”).
38. Dyersburg Mach. Works, Inc. v. Rentenbach Eng’g Co., 650 S.W.2d 378, 380–81 (Tenn.
1983) (favorably citing Bremen, but refusing to enforce the FSA at issue on the grounds that the
designated forum was inconvenient and would not be able to gain jurisdiction over certain
parties).
39. See Davenport Mach. & Foundry Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 314 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Iowa
1982) (rejecting the Bremen doctrine as applied to “outbound” FSAs that deprive Iowa courts
of jurisdiction that they otherwise would possess). However, Iowa does recognize “inbound”
FSAs that designate Iowa courts. See EFCO Corp. v. Norman Highway Constructors, Inc., 606
N.W.2d 297 (Iowa 2000) (“This is not a case in which a choice-of-forum clause has been used to
deprive a court of jurisdiction that it otherwise has. It is a case of consent to jurisdiction. Such
consent has long been recognized under Iowa law.”). Most FSA litigation involves outbound
FSAs, with the defendant seeking to prevent the plaintiff from maintaining the suit in a
nondesignated forum. Taylor, supra note 22, at 791–92.
40. Omne Fin., Inc. v. Shacks, Inc., 596 N.W.2d 591, 597 (Mich. 1999). The court rejected
the argument advanced by a dissenting judge in the lower court proceedings, who had argued
that “venue” selection provisions should be enforced under Bremen. See Omne Fin., Inc. v.
Shacks, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 641, 648–49 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (Taylor, J., dissenting); Omne, 596
N.W.2d at 593. Michigan courts do not appear to have addressed the enforceability of outbound
“jurisdiction” selection agreements.
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most outbound FSAs.41 The Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Maine,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and Washington
supreme courts have not directly addressed FSA enforceability.42
In most international contract disputes, the defendant should be
able to escape state court jurisdiction by seeking removal to federal
courts under diversity jurisdiction.43 However, removal to a federal
court does not necessarily mean that the federal court will apply
federal FSA law. For example, in Stewart Organization v. Ricoh
Corp.,44 the Supreme Court noted that Bremen was “instructive” in
41. State ex rel. Polaris Indus., Inc. v. District Court, 695 P.2d 471, 472 (Mont. 1985)
(holding that an FSA was unenforceable because it violated a Montana statute, still in force,
that establishes that “[e]very stipulation or condition in a contract by which any party thereto is
restricted from enforcing his rights under the contract by the usual proceedings in the ordinary
tribunals . . . is void” (quoting statute) (emphasis in original).
42. However, lower courts of appeals in Georgia, Indiana, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin have enforced FSAs. See Iero v. Mohawk Finishing Prods.,
Inc., 534 S.E.2d 136, 138 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (applying Bremen’s rule of prima facie
enforceability); Grott v. Jim Barna Log Sys.-Midwest, Inc., 794 N.E.2d 1098, 1102 (Ind. Ct. App.
2003) (citing Bremen and noting that under Indiana law FSAs were not “per se invalid” if they
were “freely negotiated”); HLC Fin. v. Dave Gould Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc., No. CV 03-334,
2003 Me. Super. LEXIS 200, at *2–*4 (Me. Super. Ct. 2003) (citing Bremen to justify enforcing
an FSA); Adams v. Bay, Ltd., 60 P.3d 509, 510 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002) (citing Bremen to justify
enforcement of an FSA); Sec. Credit Leasing, Inc. v. Armaly, 529 S.E.2d 283, 286–87 (S.C. Ct.
App. 2000) (enforcing a Florida judgment rendered under an FSA specifying Florida law, and
noting that under Bremen, FSAs are generally held to be valid); In re GNC Franchising, Inc., 22
S.W.3d 929, 930 (Tex. 2000) (Hecht, J., dissenting from denial of mandamus) (citing Bremen,
and noting that “[a]lthough [the Texas Supreme] Court has not had occasion to consider the
matter, the uniform view of Texas courts of appeals is that forum-selection clauses are generally
enforceable”); Voicelink Data Servs., Inc. v. Datapulse, Inc., 937 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1997) (same); Leasefirst v. Hartford Rexall Drugs, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1992) (“The rule of law in Wisconsin is that a forum selection clause is enforceable unless
the contract provision is substantively unreasonable in view of the bargaining power of the
parties.”). The Idaho Supreme Court has applied Florida FSA law, which accepts the Bremen
decision, to refuse to enforce an FSA. Cerami-Kote, Inc. v. Energywave Corp., 773 P.2d 1143,
1146–47 (Idaho 1989) (refusing to enforce an FSA on the ground that a Florida court, applying
Bremen under Florida law, would find that the FSA violated an Idaho public policy against
outbound FSAs).
43. Removal should be possible in most international contract disputes brought before
state courts. Because such disputes are likely to involve a U.S. domiciliary on one side and a
foreign domiciliary on the other (thereby establishing diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000)),
removal from state to federal courts will in most instances be proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1441
(2000). However, removal is generally not possible if the FSA appears to grant exclusive
competence specifically to state courts. See Truserv Corp. v. Prices Ilfeld Hardware Co., Inc.,
No. 01-CV-50271, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17626, at *3–*5 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (discussing a federal
court split over whether an FSA designating courts located in a particular county will preclude
removal to a federal court whose district includes that county, absent some other indication of
party intent to preclude federal jurisdiction).
44. 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
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regard to a motion to transfer venue to another federal district court
in violation of an FSA.45 The Court, however, refused to apply the
Bremen standard, cautioning that “federal common law developed
under admiralty jurisdiction [is] not freely transferable to [a] diversity
setting.”46 Some lower federal courts have nonetheless ruled that
Bremen applies to diversity cases.47 Other courts have refused to
provide a definitive answer either way on the ground that federal and
state laws are equally favorable to FSAs.48
This confusion about Bremen’s applicability in diversity cases
risks creating “ample opportunity for an unfortunate defendant to be
randomly deprived of its expectation to be sued in a previously
contracted forum” by a federal court’s application, under diversity
jurisdiction, of comparatively unfavorable state FSA laws.49 An
international FSA convention would resolve this uncertainty by
creating a federal question basis of jurisdiction that would ensure the
application of federal FSA law in all federal court actions.50 Indeed,
the New York Convention regulating the validity of international
45. Id. at 28.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 2000) (“In diversity
cases, federal law governs the analysis of the effect and scope of forum selection clauses.”);
Royal Bed & Spring Co. v. Famossul Industria e Comercio de Moveis Ltda., 906 F.2d 45, 50 (1st
Cir. 1990) (holding that “state forum non conveniens laws ought not to be binding on federal
courts in diversity cases” when deciding whether to dismiss in favor of an FSA (internal
quotation marks omitted); Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 18 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that
Bremen’s holding “has been extended in this and other circuits to diversity and other non-
admiralty cases”); Commerce Consultants Int’l, Inc. v. Vetrerie Riunite, S.p.A., 867 F.2d 697,
699–700 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (applying the Bremen rule in a diversity case without discussing the
Erie problem); Sun World Lines, Ltd. v. March Shipping Corp., 801 F.2d 1066, 1069 (8th Cir.
1986) (holding that “the enforceability of a forum clause . . . is clearly a federal procedural issue
and that federal [FSA] law controls” in diversity cases); Strategic Mktg. & Communications,
Inc. v. Kmart Corp., 41 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Precedent is clear . . . that in
diversity cases such as this one, federal common law governs the enforcement of forum selection
clauses.”).
48. See, e.g., Silva v. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 239 F.3d 385, 387 n.1 (1st Cir. 2001)
(avoiding the diversity issue on the ground that federal and Puerto Rico law were equally
favorable to FSAs); Shell v. R.W. Sturge, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1227, 1229 (6th Cir. 1995) (same for Ohio
law); Instrumentation Assocs., Inc. v. Madsen Elecs. (Canada) Ltd., 859 F.2d 4, 7 (3d Cir. 1988)
(same for Pennsylvania law).
49. Lee, supra note 28, at 694.
50. Federal district courts have “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). “[W]here a treaty
creates substantive rights that form an essential element of a plaintiff’s cause of action, federal
question jurisdiction will likely exist.” Pacheo de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1375 n.10
(11th Cir. 1998).
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arbitration agreements, discussed in detail in Part III.A, had just such
a jurisdictional effect.51
B. European Union FSA Law Generally: Council Regulation 44/2001
(Brussels II)
Unlike United States FSA law, European FSA law is primarily
statutory in origin. Brussels II is the primary European instrument
governing FSA enforcement.52 Brussels II is a comprehensive scheme
governing the exercise of jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments by national courts.53 The regulation,
including its FSA provisions in Article 23, largely supplants the 1968
Brussels Convention54 on which the proposed Hague Judgments
Convention was largely based.55
Article 23 establishes the enforceability of most business-to-
business FSAs, stating in relevant part that
If the parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in a Member State,
have agreed that a court or the courts of a Member State are to have
jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may
arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, that court or
51. See Smith/Enron Cogeneration Ltd. P’ship v. Smith Cogeneration Int’l, Inc., 198 F.3d
88, 95–96 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that the New York Convention governing international
arbitration agreements, see infra Part III.B, creates a federal question basis of jurisdiction, and
that federal courts exercising jurisdiction under the Convention’s implementing legislation
should apply “federal law . . . to the question of whether an agreement to arbitrate is
enforceable”). The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208 (2000), which implements the
New York Convention, also provides for removal to federal courts, and thus for the application
of federal arbitration law, even in the absence of diversity. See 9 U.S.C. § 205 (2000):
Where the subject matter of an action or proceeding pending in a State court relates
to an arbitration agreement or award falling under the [New York] Convention, the
defendant or the defendants may, at any time before the trial thereof, remove such
action or proceeding to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place where the action or proceeding is pending.
52. Brussels II, supra note 3.
53. See generally GAUDEMET-TALLON, supra note 3.
54. Brussels I, supra note 3.
55. The regulation’s Article 23 only slightly modifies Brussels I Article 17, and this
similarity means that European Court of Justice (E.C.J.) interpretations of Brussels I’s formal
validity provisions should govern interpretations of Brussels II’s corresponding provisions. See
generally Droz & Gaudemet-Tallon, supra note 3.
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those courts shall have jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction shall be
exclusive unless the parties have agreed otherwise.56
This provision—and the regulation generally—fully applies only
when at least one of the parties to the FSA is a European Union
member state domiciliary.57
Those European national laws may be less favorable to FSA
enforcement than is the regulation. For example, Article 48 of the
French New Code of Civil Procedure requires that FSAs be “very
clearly indicated” in the underlying contract.58 French courts applying
this language tend to analyze the legibility of the characters in which
the FSA is printed, as well as the location of the agreement in the
contract or contract-related documents, as a means of determining
whether the party against whom enforcement is sought had actual
knowledge of the FSA at the time of contracting.59 French courts have
tended to interpret this requirement strictly, and FSAs contained on
the back of contractual documents are particularly at risk, especially
if the FSA is not formatted so as to stand out from accompanying
language.60 Although French courts appear to have carved out a
56. Brussels II, supra note 3, art. 23.1. However, under other provisions of Brussels II, most
FSAs in consumer, insurance, and employment contracts are prohibited and will not be
enforced. Brussels II, supra note 3, art. 13 (prohibiting most FSAs in insurance contracts); id.
art. 17 (prohibiting most FSAs in consumer contracts); id. art. 21 (prohibiting most FSAs in
employment contracts).
57. This requirement of domicile was originally inserted into Brussels I Article 17 in order
to prevent the European Community from becoming a jurisdictional “paradise,” the fruits of
which parties with no connection to the Community could enjoy by a simple contractual
expression of desire. GEORGES A.L. DROZ, COMPÉTENCE JUDICIARE ET EFFETS DES
JUGEMENTS DANS LE MARCHÉ COMMUN: ETUDE DE LA CONVENTION DE BRUXELLES DU 27
SEPTEMBRE 1968 ¶ 183 (1972).
58. NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [N.C.P.C.] art. 48 (Fr.) establishes that
Any clause which directly or indirectly derogates from territorial jurisdictional rules is
presumed not to exist [i.e. will be considered invalid and severed from the contract],
unless the clause was agreed to by parties all of whom contracted in their capacity as
businesspeople and unless the clause was very clearly indicated in the agreement [of
the party] against whom the clause is to be enforced.
59. See CA Aix-en-Provence, Jan. 22, 1992, D. 1993, 26, at 29, note Beignier. At the most
general level, French courts are concerned with whether the forum selection provision is drafted
so as to attract the reader’s attention to its presence and import. Id.
60. See id. at 26 (refusing to enforce FSA in domestic B2B contract on the grounds that the
FSA was not apparent, because it was printed on the back of the contract form, at the bottom of
a “copious amount of dense text,” and in “tiny” characters that were “difficult to read”); see also
Cass. com., Nov. 16, 1983, 1983 Bull. Civ. IV, No. 313, at 271 (refusing to enforce a domestic
B2B FSA printed vertically in tiny characters on the margins of a bill); CA Paris, Dec. 18, 1987,
D. 1988 somm., 343, at 343 (refusing to enforce an FSA printed in French on the back of a bill,
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somewhat more favorable regime for “international” FSAs,61
American companies doing business in France and other European
countries still face the risk that unfavorable national laws will
invalidate FSAs that would be formally valid under Brussels II and
United States law.
II.  CONDITIONS OF FORMAL VALIDITY: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN UNION FSA LAW
A. Formal Validity under United States Law
United States courts, unlike their European counterparts, rarely
analyze FSAs in terms of “form,” and generally impose few explicit
conditions of formal validity upon contracts generally62 or upon FSAs
specifically.63 Indeed, United States courts generally look first and
foremost for written evidence of the existence and scope of a forum
selection agreement.64 However, because “the intent of the parties
governs,”65 federal courts may supplement fragmentary written
when the party against whom enforcement was sought was an Anglophone, the bill’s other
provisions were written in English, and the parties’ business dealings were in English).
61. Cass. 1e civ., Dec. 17, 1985, D. 1986 inf. rap., 265, at 265, obs. Bernard Audit (“Cie de
signaux et d’entreprises électriques v. Sorelec”) (holding that “international” FSAs are “legal in
principle” and are not prohibited under N.C.P.C. Article 48, which strictly limits the
enforceability of most FSAs). However, because the French legal system officially discourages
jurisprudential lawmaking, Sorelec’s strong statement of support for international FSAs is much
less clearly binding or stable “law” than is the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Bremen. For a brief discussion of the limited role of precedent in the French legal system, see
Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part One of a Trilogy),
14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 845, 908–14 (1999).
62. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1 (2001) (The U.C.C.’s requirement of a “writing” for the
formal validity of most sales contracts requires only “that the writing afford a basis for believing
that the offered oral evidence rests on a real transaction. It may be written in lead pencil on a
scratch pad. . . . The only term which must appear is the quantity term which need not be
accurately stated.”).
63. See, e.g., Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Internet: Mondialisation de la communication—
mondialisation de la résolution des litiges?, in INTERNET: WHICH COURT DECIDES? WHICH
LAW APPLIES? 89, 125 (Katharina Boele-Woelki & Catherine Kessedjian eds., 1998) (noting
that “American [FSA] law does not recognize requirements of form, such that questions of form
arise only in relation to proof” that the FSA exists). However, Nebraska requires by statute that
FSAs be made “in writing.” Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc’y v. Yelich, 549 N.W.2d 172,
175 (Neb. 1996).
64. See John Wyeth & Brother Ltd. v. Cigna Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1075 (3d Cir. 1997)
(“[W]hether or not [an FSA] applies depends on what the specific clause at issue says.”); see also
Kukje Hwajae Ins. Co. v. The “M/V Hyundai Liberty,” 294 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2002)
(examining the scope of a purported FSA as an “initial matter”).
65. Polar Shipping, Ltd. v. Oriental Shipping Corp., 680 F.2d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 1982).
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evidence with extrinsic evidence of consent, such as evidence of
course of performance, prior course of dealing, and trade usage.66 For
example, federal courts have enforced FSAs that were never finalized
in writing,67 that were never signed,68 that were located on the back of
order confirmations69 and standardized order forms,70 that were
contained in small-print boilerplate on the back of an employment
contract,71 and that were included in purely oral contracts.72
Although most state courts appear willing to enforce such FSAs
as well,73 certain state courts may impose somewhat stricter formal
requirements. For example, the Nevada Supreme Court, while citing
Bremen favorably, nonetheless declined to enforce an FSA on the
grounds that the
clause was buried on the very bottom of the back page of the lease
agreement, in very fine print, in a paragraph labelled
MISCELLANEOUS. The signatures are on the front page of the
agreement. Nothing on the front page notifies the reader of the
66. More generally, United States courts routinely use such extrinsic evidence to
“determine the meaning” of certain contracts when faced with ambiguous written evidence of
the agreement. See U.C.C. § 2-208 (2001) (authorizing the use of course of performance, prior
course of dealing, and trade usage to interpret sales contracts). European national courts may
enjoy similar interpretive latitude. See, e.g., CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1156 (Fr.) (“[When
interpreting] contracts, [the court] must determine the common intent of the parties, rather than
stopping with the literal sense of the terms.”).
67. See, e.g., Evolution Online Sys., Inc. v. Koninklijke Nederland N.V., 41 F. Supp. 2d 447,
450 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (enforcing an FSA on the basis of draft documents and course of
performance, even though the parties had never entered into a written contract).
68. Roberts & Schaefer Co. v. Merit Contracting, Inc., 99 F.3d 248, 252–53 (7th Cir. 1996)
(enforcing an FSA contained in an unsigned purchase order on the basis of course of dealing
and the surrounding circumstances).
69. Nordyne, Inc. v. Int’l Controls & Measurements Corp., 262 F.3d 843, 847 (8th Cir.
2001) (using prior course of dealing to determine that plaintiff had agreed to an FSA on the
back of an invoice); see also New Moon Shipping Co. v. Man B&W Diesel AG, 121 F.3d 24, 31–
32 (2d Cir. 1997) (indicating a willingness to use prior course of dealing to enforce an FSA
contained in general conditions of sale that were excerpted and referenced generally on order
confirmations).
70. Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110, 1119 (1st Cir. 1993); see also Monsanto Co. v.
McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (enforcing an FSA contained on the back of the
contract’s signature page).
71. Silva v. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 239 F.3d 385, 389 (1st Cir. 2001).
72. W.G. Nichols, Inc. v. Kmart Corp., No. 01-3295, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24131, at *4
(E.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that an FSA in a written contract also applied to related oral
contracts); see also Chateau des Charmes Wines Ltd. v. Sabate USA Inc., 328 F.3d 528, 531 (9th
Cir. 2003) (suggesting that the court could enforce FSAs contained in purely oral contracts).
73. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
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specific forum selection clause on the back page. The clause is not
even in bold print.74
Federal courts may also impose strict duties to read and to
investigate the content of general conditions of sale that are
referenced only generally in a given contract. For example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has noted that
“a party who agrees to terms in writing without understanding or
investigating those terms does so at his own peril.”75 The court
proceeded to enforce a German-language FSA contained in
standardized conditions of sale promulgated by an association of
German machine manufacturers, even though those conditions were
referenced only obliquely in the contract,76 and even though the
American party protesting enforcement was unfamiliar with the
German language and with the German industry standards.77
Despite their reluctance to impose explicit formal conditions of
validity, United States federal courts are likely to place particularly
heavy emphasis on the precise wording of the FSA when deciding
whether the agreement is permissive or exclusive. For example, if an
FSA specifies that a particular “venue shall” be competent, federal
courts are likely to presume that the parties intended to establish the
exclusive competence of the “venue” specified.78 However, if the
parties have drafted their FSA to provide only that a particular
“jurisdiction shall” have jurisdiction, without also mentioning a
“venue,” courts are likely to interpret the agreement as permissive,
74. Tandy Computer Leasing v. Terina’s Pizza, Inc., 784 P.2d 7, 8 (Nev. 1989). Illinois
courts have similarly refused to enforce “FSAs contained in boilerplate language.” See Williams
v. Ill. State Scholarship Comm’n., 563 N.E.2d 465, 486–87 (Ill. 1990) (citing Bremen, but refusing
to enforce an FSA on the ground that, among other reasons, the FSA was contained in non-
negotiated “boilerplate”); Mellon First United Leasing v. Hansen, 705 N.E.2d 121, 125–26 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1998) (citing Bremen, but refusing to enforce an FSA on the ground that it was
“boilerplate language in small print on the back of a preprinted form” that was “like an
adhesion contract”).
75. Paper Express, Ltd. v. Pfankuch Maschinen GmbH, 972 F.2d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 1992).
The court also suggested that “a blind or illiterate party (or simply one unfamiliar with the
contract language) who signs the contract without learning of its contents would be bound” by
an FSA contained therein through a general reference to standard conditions of sale. Id.
76. The clause supposedly referencing the FSA stated only the following: “Warranty: 6
months according to the rules of VDMA and ZVEI [the German industry standards].” Id. at
754.
77. Id. at 757–58.
78. Nascone v. Spudnuts, Inc., 735 F.2d 763, 765 (3d Cir. 1984).
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absent some additional, explicit indication of exclusivity.79 This strong
presumption of nonexclusivity for jurisdiction selection agreements
notably contrasts with the explicit presumption in European Union
law that FSAs are “exclusive unless the parties have agreed
otherwise.”80 Furthermore, by attaching such significance to the
parties’ failure to designate a venue in writing along with a
jurisdiction, United States federal courts fall back into a formalism
that is at odds with the general tendency of United States law to
enforce FSAs absent compelling evidence of unreasonableness.
In summary, then, United States FSA law rarely purports to
apply generally applicable rules of formal validity. Although in
practice United States courts will refuse to enforce an FSA absent
some tangible, external proof of the agreement’s existence and of the
parties’ consent thereto, those courts rarely require written proof to
exist in a specific form.81
B. Formal Validity under European Union Law
While United States FSA law generally avoids imposing explicit
formal conditions of validity, Brussels I, Brussels II, and the Hague
Conference’s work on the proposed judgments convention all impose
a similar scheme of four alternative permissible “forms” in which
FSAs may be concluded. Under the Brussels II formulation, an FSA
79. For a recent example, see K & V Scientific Co. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke
Aktiengesellschaft, 314 F.3d 494, 496, 499–500 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that an FSA stating that
“[j]urisdiction for all and any disputes arising out of or in connection with this agreement is
Munich” was permissive, because the parties did not mention a particular “venue”). This
differential treatment of venue and jurisdiction selection agreements appears to be common
across the federal court system. See Arguss Communications Group, Inc. v. Teletron, Inc., No.
99-257-JD, 1999 U.S. Dist LEXIS 18085, at *23–*24 (D.N.H. 1999) (listing circuits and courts
following the rule, and giving examples of permissive and mandatory clauses); Hull 753 Corp. v.
Elbe Flugzeugwerke GmbH, 58 F. Supp. 2d 925, 927–28 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (holding that a clause
stating that “[t]his Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws
of the Federal Republic of Germany” and that the “[p]lace of jurisdiction shall be Dresden” was
permissive, and not exclusive, such that the parties were technically not prevented from bringing
suit in the United States). However, the court then dismissed the suit on the ground of forum
non conveniens, stating that the suit should still be brought in Germany. Id. at 930.
80. Brussels II, supra note 3, art. 23.
81. Written evidence of consent, although generally not required, may nevertheless be
given considerable weight in determining whether the parties have in fact consented to an
enforceable FSA. See, e.g., Grott v. Jim Barna Log Sys.-Midwest, Inc., 794 N.E.2d 1098, 1102–03
(Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Bremen and holding that the FSA was “freely negotiated” and
enforceable even though the FSA was contained in a standard-form purchase agreement,
because the customer, who was seeking to invalidate the clause, had initialed each paragraph of
the purchase agreement and had signed the last page).
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is formally valid only if it has been made either (1) “in writing,” (2)
orally and “evidenced in writing,” (3) “in a form which accords with
practices which the parties have established between themselves,” or
(4) in a form which accords with trade “usage.”82 Member states may
not impose additional formal requirements beyond these four.83 The
Hague Conference’s informal working group on the FSA Convention
has adopted a similar “four forms” framework that largely follows the
Brussels II model.84
Article 23 of Brussels II does not indicate whether a court may
refuse to enforce an FSA on the ground of lack of real consent even
when the FSA technically complies with one of the four permitted
forms. The European Court of Justice (E.C.J.) has clarified, however,
that the formal requirements are in fact designed “to ensure that
consensus between the parties is in fact established,”85 and that the
reality of that consensus must be “clearly and precisely
demonstrated.”86 The following subsections will review each of these
four requirements, exploring the requirements’ ambiguity and
examining how the courts have played an important interpretive role
in delineating their definitions.
1. An Agreement in Writing. Although Article 23 fails to offer a
general definition of a “writing,” the article does suggest that a
82. Brussels II, supra note 3, art. 23.1.
83. Case 150/80, Elefanten Schuh GmbH v. Jacqmain, 1981 E.C.R. 1671, ¶¶ 21–29 (holding
that “contracting states are not free to lay down formal requirements other than those contained
in [Article 17 of the Brussels] convention”).
84. The current draft of the Hague Conference text establishes that
[a] choice of court agreement shall be valid as to form [only] if it was entered into—
(a) in writing or by any other means of communication which renders information
accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference;
(b) orally and evidenced in writing . . . ;
(c) in accordance with a usage which is regularly observed by the parties . . . ;
(d) in accordance with a usage which the parties . . . knew or ought to have known
and which is regularly observed by parties to contracts of the same nature in the
particular trade or commerce concerned.
Schulz, Preliminary Document No. 22, supra note 7, art. 3 (“Formal Validity”).
85. Case C-106/95, Mainschiffahrts-Genossenschaft eG (MSG) v. Les Gravières Rhénanes
SARL, 1997 E.C.R. I-911, ¶ 15. This purpose imposes on the seised court “the duty of
examining . . . whether the clause conferring jurisdiction upon it was in fact the subject of
consensus between the parties.” Id.
86. Case 24/76, Estasis Salotti di Colzani Aimo et Gianmario Colzani v. Rüwa
Polstereimaschinen GmbH, 1976 E.C.R. 1831, ¶ 7.
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writing is “a durable record of the [forum selection] agreement.”87
This definition leaves unspecified the necessary content or context of
that writing, an issue that the E.C.J. and national courts have
struggled with since Brussels I was originally adopted.88 For example,
the E.C.J. first attempted to delineate the concept of an “agreement
in writing” in the 1976 Calzoni case.89 There, the court was asked to
determine whether an FSA contained in the general conditions of sale
printed on the back of a signed contract could be considered an
“agreement in writing” even though the front of the contract did not
refer to the conditions on the reverse.90 The court held that such an
FSA could not be considered an “agreement in writing” unless the
front of the contract contained an “express” reference to the general
conditions on the reverse.91 The court emphasized that the purpose of
this requirement was to assure that the parties’ consent to the FSA
was “clearly and precisely demonstrated.”92
Notwithstanding this early indication that the requirement of an
“agreement in writing” should be “strictly construed,”93 there is at
least one indication that the E.C.J. has somewhat relaxed its
interpretation of the requirements for this form. In Powell Duffryn
plc v. Petereit,94 the court held that an FSA contained in a
corporation’s statutes is an “agreement in writing” enforceable
against shareholders as long as the FSA has been incorporated into
the corporate statutes “in accordance with the provisions of the
applicable national law” and are “lodged in a place to which the
shareholder may have access . . . or are contained in a public
87. Brussels II, supra note 3, art. 23.2 (establishing that “[a]ny communication by electronic
means which provides a durable record of the agreement shall be equivalent to ‘writing’”). The
Hague Conference’s preliminary formal validity provisions similarly equate a “writing” with
“any other means of communication which renders information accessible so as to be usable for
subsequent reference.” Schulz, Preliminary Document No. 22, supra note 7, art. 3.
88. See, e.g., GAUDEMET-TALLON, supra note 3, ¶ 138 n.39 (listing numerous French court
decisions interpreting the E.C.J.’s “agreement in writing” jurisprudence).
89. Estasis Salotti di Colzani Aimo et Gianmario Colzani, 1976 E.C.R. 1831, ¶ 3. The
decision has been cited favorably in subsequent E.C.J. decisions. See, e.g., Case C-159/97,
Trasporti Castelletti Spedizioni Internazionali SpA v. Hugo Trumpy SpA, 1999 E.C.R. I-1597, ¶
13.
90. Estasis Salotti di Colzani Aimo et Gianmario Colzani, 1976 E.C.R. 1831, ¶ 3.
91. Id. ¶ 10.
92. Id. ¶ 7. The E.C.J. also admitted that an FSA was a formally valid “writing” if the
contract at issue “express[ly]” referred to earlier offers, which themselves included a written
FSA, and which could be “checked by a party exercising reasonable care.” Id. ¶ 13.
93. Id. ¶ 7.
94. Case C-214/89, Powell Duffryn plc v. Petereit, 1992 E.C.R. I-1745.
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register.”95 However, despite this apparent relaxation of Colzani’s
principle of “strict” construction, national courts continue to construe
the requirement of an “agreement in writing” rather strictly. For
instance, European courts remain unlikely to enforce a nonobvious
forum selection “agreement in writing,” such as one printed in tiny
characters on the back of a signed form contract, or written in a
language unfamiliar to one of the parties,96 or contained in general
conditions of sale separate from the contract itself.97 National courts
may also refuse to enforce FSAs contained in contracts that have
been tacitly accepted but have not been signed. For example, the
German high court recently refused to enforce an FSA contained in a
loan guarantee form against the borrower on the ground that the
borrower had not signed the form.98 The court held that it was
insufficient that the borrower’s guarantor—her husband—had signed
the form and that she herself had received a copy of the form and
accepted the borrowed money.99
95. Id. ¶¶ 19–28.
96. See, e.g., Cass. com., Feb. 27, 1996, R.C.D.I.P. 1996, 732, at 734, note H.G.-T (holding
invalid an FSA written in illegible characters and in an unfamiliar language); CA Grenoble, ch.
com., Oct. 23, 1996, R.C.D.I.P. 1997, 757, at 759, note Anne Sinay-Cytermann (refusing to
enforce an FSA under Brussels I Article 17 on the ground, in part, that the clause was printed in
tiny print on the reverse of one party’s general conditions of sale in a language not spoken by
the other party and not used in their course of dealing). Cf. Cass. 1e civ., Jan. 9, 1996, R.C.D.I.P.
1996, 731, at 733, note H.G.-T. (holding that the parties’ extensive prior course of dealing meant
that illegibility of FSA on back of standardized form contract was insufficient to invalidate the
FSA for lack of consent under Brussels I).
97. See, e.g., Cass. 1e civ., Feb. 23, 1994, JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL
[J.D.I.] 1995, 155, at 155–56, note André Huet (refusing to enforce an FSA contained in a
company’s general conditions of sale, themselves on file in a public depository, absent a
reference to those conditions in the contract at issue, and absent proof that the party against
whom enforcement was sought had knowledge of the content of those conditions at the time of
contracting).
98. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Supreme Court], Feb. 22, 2001, available at
http://www.curia.eu.int/common/recdoc/convention/en/2001/29-2001.htm (on file with the Duke
Law Journal http://www.curia.eu.int/common/recdoc/convention/en/2001/29-2001.htm).
99. Id. The E.C.J. has similarly suggested that in the absence of prior course of dealing or
trade usage permitting tacit acceptance, a contract containing an FSA must be signed by both
parties if it is to meet the requirement of an “agreement in writing.” See Case 71/83,
Partenreederei ms. Tilly Russ v. NV Haven & Vervoerbedrijf Nova, 1984 E.C.R. 2417, ¶¶ 16–18
(observing that an FSA contained in a bill of lading signed by the carrier, but not by the shipper,
would not be enforceable against the shipper because the shipper had not “expressed in writing
his consent”); see also Case 313/85, SpA Iveco Fiat v. Van Hool NV, 1986 E.C.R. 3337, ¶ 10
(holding that where a written contract containing an FSA has expired, but where the parties
continue to rely tacitly on the expired contract to govern their relationship, the FSA is not an
enforceable agreement in writing unless there is a written confirmation that the expired FSA
continues to govern the relationship).
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2. An (Oral) Agreement Evidenced in Writing. Under Brussels
II, an FSA that is “evidenced in writing” is formally valid.100 The
brevity of this clause leaves unanswered at least two fundamental
questions: (1) what factors determine the sufficiency of an (oral)
agreement that is to be evidenced, and (2) what factors determine the
sufficiency of the written evidence?
As to the first question, the E.C.J. has ruled on two occasions
that the oral “agreement” must itself have been “expressly relat[ed]”
to the FSA;101 the fact that the parties have orally agreed to a contract
as a whole is inadequate. On the other hand, it remains unclear
whether an oral agreement to one party’s general conditions of sale is
sufficient, without the parties having specifically agreed to be bound
by an FSA contained therein. For example, national courts may be
willing to accept an oral agreement to one party’s general conditions
as formally valid if those conditions are known to the party against
whom enforcement is sought, or delivered in writing to that party
prior to or at the time of contract formation.102 However, national
courts remain hostile to “oral agreements evidenced in writing” that
are evidenced only by postcontractual writings, such as general
conditions of sale contained on postcontract billing statements, even
100. The French version establishes that an FSA is formally valid if concluded “verbalement
avec confirmation écrite,” that is, if it is concluded “orally with written confirmation.”
Règlement du Conseil du 22 décembre 2000 concernant la compétence judicaire, la
reconnaissance et l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale, 2001 J.O. (L 12) 1,
art. 23.1(a). The English version specifies that the “agreement” is to be “evidenced”—not
“confirmed”—in writing. Brussels II, supra note 3, art. 23.1(a). Furthermore, the English
version does not specify that the evidenced agreement is to be “oral.” The reason for the
discrepancy between the English and French versions is unclear. In any event, the Hague
Conference delegates appear to have rejected the French formulation. See Schulz, Preliminary
Document No. 22, supra note 7, at 15.
101. Partenreederei ms. Tilly Russ, 1984 E.C.R. 2417, ¶ 17 (ruling that an FSA is formally
valid if the clause has been the subject matter of a prior oral agreement between the parties
expressly relating to that clause, in which case the bill of lading, signed by the carrier, must be
regarded as confirmation in writing of the oral agreement); see also Case 221/84, F. Berghoefer
GmbH & Co. KG v. ASA SA, 1985 E.C.R. 2699, ¶ 16 (ruling that an FSA is formally valid “if it
is established that jurisdiction was conferred by express oral agreement, that written
confirmation of that agreement by one of the parties was received by the other and that the
latter raised no objection”).
102. Florence Bernard, Les clauses attributives de juridiction dans les conventions judiciares
européennes 158 (2000) (unpublished doctoral thesis, Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris II)) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal).
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when the party receiving the document does not protest the FSA
contained therein.103
As to the second question, early jurisprudence suggested that a
confirmatory writing must emanate from the party against whom
enforcement of the oral FSA was sought,104 although more recent
jurisprudence appears to accept that a confirmatory writing may
emanate from either party.105 However, absent some other written
proof of the oral agreement, national courts are likely to refuse to
enforce an oral FSA that is evidenced only by a written confirmation
emanating from the party who seeks enforcement, especially if this
confirmation was transmitted to the other party after contract
formation.106 For example, both French and German courts have
refused to enforce “oral” FSAs evidenced only in postcontractual
documents, on the grounds that a party’s silence upon receipt of such
documents is not sufficient proof of an earlier oral agreement
expressly relating to the FSA.107
These uncertainties surrounding this form of FSAs have led one
observer to conclude that outside of a written FSA, the risks that a
national court will refuse to enforce an FSA “evidenced in writing”
are “numerous.”108 Those risks include principally the uneven
treatment by national courts of one party’s silence upon receipt of a
unilateral, postcontract confirmation that contains an FSA, as well as
103. Id. at 183–93. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recently
demonstrated a similar hostility. See Chateau des Charmes Wines Ltd. v. Sabate USA Inc., 328
F.3d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 2003) (refusing to enforce an FSA contained in invoices sent in response
to an oral sales contract, even though the party receiving the confirmations never protested the
FSA contained therein).
104. See Case 25/76, Galeries Segoura SPRL v. Société Rahim Bonakdarian, 1976 E.C.R.
1851, ¶ 8 (refusing to enforce against the buyer a jurisdiction clause in the vendor’s general
conditions of sale).
105. See F. Berghoefer GmbH & Co. KG, 1985 E.C.R. 2699, ¶ 16 (ruling that an FSA is
formally valid “if it is established that jurisdiction was conferred by express oral agreement, that
written confirmation of that agreement by one of the parties was received by the other and that
the latter raised no objection”).
106. Bernard, supra note 102, at 159–61; see, e.g., Supremo Tribunal de Justiça [Supreme
Court], June 12, 1997, COLECTÂNEA DE JURISPRUDÊNCIA 1997, II, 122, at 126 (Port.) (holding
that an FSA was formally invalid when it appeared in the terms of sale on the back of a
confirmation of an order and was sent by the seller to the buyer), available at
http://www.curia.eu.int/common/recdoc/convention/en/1998/44-1998.htm (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
107. Bernard, supra note 102, at 159–61 (citing German and French cases refusing to enforce
oral FSAs when the only proof of the FSA is a postcontractual confirmation).
108. Id. at 195.
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the uncertain requirements of proof of the oral agreement.109 As such,
“[t]he use of this form remains . . . dangerous for all contracting
parties.”110
3. Forms Admitted by “Practices Which the Parties Have
Established between Themselves.” Under Brussels II, an FSA is also
formally valid if it has been made “in a form which accords with
practices which the parties have established between themselves.”111
The E.C.J. has thus far left the interpretation of this “practices” form
to national courts.112 Those courts have generally established that a
“practice” must involve repeated contracting regarding a subject
similar to the subject of the contract at issue.113 For instance, the
French Cour de Cassation has invoked the “practices” provision to
enforce an FSA that was printed in tiny characters and in a foreign
language, located in one party’s general conditions of sale on the back
of that party’s order confirmations and billing statements.114 The court
noted that the parties had a prior course of dealing extending back
ten years, involving the exchange of “hundreds” of documents
containing the FSA, and during which the party seeking to escape
enforcement had never complained about the FSA.115 This “practices”
form may also justify enforcement of an FSA contained in one party’s
general conditions of sale that are not explicitly referenced in a
109. See id. at 184–95 (analyzing this form of FSA in the context of bills of lading).
110. Id. at 184. The author concludes that “[i]t is clear that the drafting of Article 17 on this
point [the form of an oral agreement confirmed in writing] is not adapted to the needs of
international commerce.” Id. at 195.
111. Brussels II, supra note 3, art. 23.1(b).
112. Bernard, supra note 102, at 205. However, early E.C.J. jurisprudence recognized a
similar concept of “continuing trading relationship[s].” Case 25/76, Galeries Segoura SPRL v.
Société Rahim Bonakdarian, 1976 E.C.R. 1851, ¶ 11. In Segoura, the E.C.J. suggested that such
relationships could justify enforcement of an FSA contained in one party’s general conditions of
sale that are transmitted to the other party after the conclusion of an oral contract, even if the
oral contract did not expressly reference those general conditions or the FSA contained therein.
Id. Such an FSA would not normally be enforceable as an “oral agreement evidenced in
writing” because of the lack of an “express” reference to the FSA in the oral agreement. See
supra note 101 and accompanying text. The Segoura jurisprudence provided the inspiration for
Article 23’s “practices” form, and was first incorporated into Brussels I in 1989. GAUDEMET-
TALLON, supra note 3, ¶ 146.
113. Bernard, supra note 102, at 202–04.
114. Cass. 1e civ., Jan. 9, 1996, R.C.D.I.P. 1996, 731, at 732, note H.G.-T.
115. Id. In a decision handed down just one month later, another chamber of the Cour de
Cassation refused to enforce an “illegible” FSA in a signed contract when the parties had had
no prior course of dealing. Cass. com., Feb. 27, 1996, R.C.D.I.P. 1996, 732, at 733, note H.G.-T.
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particular exchange of contractual documents.116 Courts also cite the
“practices” form to justify enforcement of FSAs contained in general
conditions of sale that are themselves contained on the back of
unsigned, postcontract billing statements.117
While Brussels II’s “practices” form has been criticized as being
“vague and giving rise to difficulties of proof” in its application,118 the
form provides a necessary flexibility missing from the more rigid
forms of an “agreement in writing” and an “oral agreement evidenced
in writing.”119 However, even supporters of the “practices” form
suggest that its real utility is in helping to determine the sufficiency of
written evidence of an FSA contained in a prior oral agreement.120 As
such, it is of questionable value to view “practices” as a separate form
distinct from “agreements in writing” or “evidenced in writing.”121
4. Forms Admitted by International Trade Usage. Article 23
provides that an FSA is formally valid if “in international trade or
commerce,” the FSA has been made “in a form which accords with a
usage of which the parties are or ought to have been aware and which
in such trade or commerce is widely known to, and regularly observed
by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade or
commerce concerned.”122 This final permissible FSA form is designed
to accord with modern commercial practice, in which parties often
conclude agreements orally or by telex that specify only the essential
116. GAUDEMET-TALLON, supra note 3, ¶ 146 (noting that this form reflects the principle
that “[w]hen an exporter and importer conclude each month thousands of contracts involving
identical merchandise while specifying by telex, telephone, or fax only the quantity, quality, and
price, one cannot ignore the general conditions of sale that regularly underlie their commercial
relations and which could contain a [FSA]" (quoting Art, préc. R.C. 1989, p. 23)).
117. See Cass. 1e civ., July 6, 1999, D. 1999 inf. rap., 212 (reprimanding the lower court for
refusing to enforce such an FSA under Brussels I Article 17 without first determining if
enforcement was justified by any practices established between the parties).
118. GAUDEMET-TALLON, supra note 3, ¶ 146.
119. Bernard, supra note 102, at 223–24 (noting that the “practices” form is “well-adapted to
[commercial] practice” because it “takes into account the specifics of each case and offers an
appropriate solution, because “[t]his new form [of FSA] is useful and frequently applied”).
120. Id. at 208 (observing that the jurisprudence that inspired the “practices” form
“developed precisely to address litigation over written confirmations”).
121. Id. (noting that it is “debatable” whether “practices” should have become a form
“distinct” from the forms of an “agreement in writing” or an “oral agreement confirmed in
writing”).
122. Brussels II, supra note 3, art. 23.1(c).
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terms of the transaction, like price and quantity.123 Written
confirmations, often signed only by one party and referencing that
party’s conditions of sale only generally, may then be exchanged after
the initial oral agreement or exchange of documents has been made.
The principal effect of this “trade usage” form is to create a
presumption of party consent to an FSA when such a “usage” exists,
even when the FSA does not conform to the forms of an “agreement
in writing” or “evidenced in writing.”124 For example, trade usage can
indicate the sufficiency of the “physical appearance” of a given FSA,
of the language in which it is drafted, of its location in the document,
or whether a document containing or referring to the FSA need
be signed.125
However, the trade usage form has been criticized on the ground
that its vagueness increases the uncertainty of enforcement by making
it impossible to predict in advance whether a seised court will find an
“international trade usage” to exist in a given instance.126 As one
scholar argues, “it will be nearly impossible to predict in advance”
whether a national judge will find that a trade usage exists, with the
outcome varying “noticeably according to whether the judge
emphasizes the reality of party consent, or the flexibility necessary in
international commerce.”127 Furthermore, because of the possibility
that the trade usage provision creates an unrebuttable presumption of
consent, the trade usage provision exists somewhat uneasily with the
other three “forms,” which, as the E.C.J. has repeatedly emphasized,
are designed to ensure the “real[ity]” of the parties’ consent.128
123. See Bernard, supra note 102, at 225 (presenting the results of a House of Lords inquiry
into Brussels I Article 17).
124. GAUDEMET-TALLON, supra note 3, ¶ 147, at 109; see also Case C-106/95,
Mainschiffahrts-Genossenschaft eG (MSG) v. Les Gravières Rhénanes SARL, 1997 E.C.R. I-
911, ¶¶ 17, 19 (holding that once usage is demonstrated, the party against whom enforcement is
sought is “presumed” to have consented to an FSA conforming to that form).
125. Case C-159/97, Trasporti Castelletti Spedizioni Internazionali SpA v. Hugo Trumpy
SpA, 1999 E.C.R. I-1597 , ¶ 36 (holding that the trade usage provision requires national courts
“to determine whether . . . the physical appearance of the jurisdiction clause, including the
language in which it is drawn up, and its insertion in a standard form . . . not . . . signed by the
party not involved in drawing it up, are consistent” trade usage.).
126. GAUDEMET-TALLON, supra note 3, ¶147, at 108.
127. Hélène Gaudemet-Tallon, 86 R.C.D.I.P. 563, 574 (1997) (note to Les Gravières
Rhénanes SARL, 1997 E.C.R. I-911).
128. See, e.g., Les Gravières Rhénanes SARL, 1997 E.C.R. I-911, ¶ 17 (“[I]t is still one of the
aims of that provision [Brussels I Article 17] to ensure that there is real consent on the part of
the persons concerned.”). Bernard suggests the possibility that the “trade usage” provision
could justify enforcing an FSA contained in general conditions of sale which had never been
YACKEE.DOC 07/07/04  1:40 PM
1204 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:1179
Despite this complexity and ambiguity, the E.C.J. has offered
little guidance to national courts, as the E.C.J.’s few decisions largely
repeat the provision nearly verbatim.129 Perhaps because of this
continuing uncertainty, the trade usage form remains rarely used, and
its ultimate effect on the enforcement of FSAs is unclear.130
III.  SUGGESTIONS FOR A NEW APPROACH TO CONDITIONS OF
FORMAL VALIDITY
A. The Need for a Detailed but Flexible International FSA
Convention
Although United States FSA law does not generally impose
explicit conditions of formal validity, the discussion above shows that
in practice United States courts, like European courts, often demand
written or other extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent to enter into
an FSA.131 With the exception of the presumption of nonexclusivity in
United States law,132 the discussion in Part II indicates that United
States and European FSA law are not in fundamental discordance, as
FSAs are generally enforceable—and enforced—under both regimes
as long as such evidence exists.
transmitted to the other party, and the contents of which the party had no knowledge. Bernard,
supra note 102, at 277. Such an interpretation, she notes, would not respect the primary
objective of the other three forms: the assurance that an FSA in a contract does not go
unnoticed. Id.
129. See, e.g., Trasporti Castelletti Spedizioni Internazionali SpA, which unhelpfully explains
that the trade usage provision is to be interpreted as follows:
The existence of a usage, which must be determined in relation to the branch of trade
or commerce in which the parties to the contract operate, is established where a
particular course of conduct is generally and regularly followed by operators in that
branch when concluding contracts of a particular type.
Trasporti Castelletti Spedizioni Internazionali SpA, 1999 E.C.R. I-1597, ¶ 30.
130. See Gaudemet-Tallon, supra note 127, at 572–74 (noting the difficulties facing judges in
applying the trade usage “form”). For example, the French Cour de Cassation has implicitly
refused to engage in “trade usage” analysis, perhaps due to the complexity and uncertainty
involved therein. See Cass. 1e civ., Feb. 23, 1994, J.D.I. 1995, 155, at 156, note André Huet
(refusing to address a trade usage argument in holding that Article 17 requires written
acceptance of an FSA contained in general conditions of sale, absent prior course of dealing);
see also Cass. com., Oct. 18, 1994, 1995 R.C.D.I.P. 721, at 727, note to Société SBCN v. M.B.
Marine Spa (noting that French jurisprudence has shown a “firm and reaffirmed . . . suspicion”
towards the “trade usage” form, on the grounds that trade usage is “insufficient” to establish a
party’s “irrefutable and well-informed” consent to an FSA).
131. See supra Part II.A.
132. See supra Part II.A.
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That said, it should be clear that United States and European
approaches to conditions of formal validity are quite different in
method, if not always in effect.133 United States FSA law, largely
jurisprudential in nature, imposes few explicit conditions of formal
validity. United States courts instead have adopted an amorphous but
flexible approach that emphasizes the reality of the parties’ consent
while offering few formal safeguards to assure that consent is real.
The Brussels I approach, on the other hand, provides a rigid, explicit
framework of formal safeguards designed specifically to assure the
reality of consent. Although both approaches usually support FSA
enforcement, the United States approach may lead to the
enforcement of FSAs absent a meaningful opportunity to actually
consent, as illustrated by Paper Express, Ltd. v. Pfankuch Maschinen
GmbH.134 As such, an FSA convention that incorporates explicit
formal conditions of validity is not necessarily incompatible with
current United States law. Indeed, explicit formal conditions of
validity may be justified to the extent necessary to ensure that the
parties to a given FSA have voluntarily entered into that agreement.
The rigidity of the European “four forms” approach, however,
arguably errs in the other direction by encouraging courts to refuse
enforcement on the ground of formal invalidity even when the parties
have actually consented to an FSA. Furthermore, despite the surface
clarity of the European model, the “four forms” framework still
contains important ambiguities that have forced the E.C.J. to play an
extremely active interpretive role.135 For example, as of 2000, Brussels
I Article 17 had been the subject of sixteen E.C.J. decisions, more
than any other convention article save Article 5.1, which itself
133. See supra Part II.A–B.
134. 972 F.2d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 1992). This case is discussed in detail, supra notes 75–77 and
accompanying text. See also Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1294–95 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(enforcing an FSA on the back of a form “Technology Agreement” for a seed contract despite
the farmer’s argument that he had had no knowledge of the FSA at the time of contract
formation because he had not read the reverse side of the form).
135. For example, it remains especially unclear if satisfaction of one of the four conditions of
formal validity definitively establishes the “reality” of that consent, or whether instead the
satisfaction of a condition of formal validity merely creates a rebuttable presumption of consent.
The question is most important in cases where the “form” is one established by “practices” or
“trade usage,” in which formally adequate evidence may nonetheless obscure lack of true
consent. See Bernard, supra note 102, at 323 (suggesting that the demonstration of a “practice”
creates a presumption of consent absent any “protests” upon receipt of the FSA conforming to
the practice by the party seeking to escape enforcement).
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supplies special jurisdictional rules for contract disputes.136 As the
E.C.J. itself has emphasized, its “autonomous” (or independent)
interpretation of Brussels I has proven necessary to promote uniform
application across the parties to the Convention.137 To the extent that
the E.C.J. has failed to dispel ambiguities, there remains ample room
for national courts to apply their own—often stricter—standards of
enforcement when judging the adequacy of formal evidence of
consent.138
Although the E.C.J. has only partially succeeded in its role as the
“autonomous” interpreter of Brussels I, such an interpretive body
does not exist at the world level. Furthermore, an international FSA
convention will apply to a greater number of more diverse legal
systems than does Brussels II, leading to an increased danger of
divergent national interpretations. As such, an FSA convention based
on the Brussels model risks failing to achieve the Hague Conference’s
central statutory purpose: “the progressive unification of the rules of
private international law.”139 In order to promote the predictable
enforcement of FSAs cross-nationally, The Hague Conference’s
“choice of court” convention should go beyond the current European
model in both depth and detail, while also avoiding the undue rigidity
of the “four forms” approach.
B. Lessons from the New York Convention
The analysis in Section A suggests that the Brussels model of
formal validity may not be well-suited to an international choice-of-
court convention. In fact, the United States’s experience
136. See A.H., 127 J.D.I. 527 (2000) (noting that Brussels I Articles 5.1 and 17 had each been
the subject of sixteen E.C.J. decisions, more than any other Brussels I article).
137. Case C-125/92, Mulox IBC Ltd. v. Geels, 1993 E.C.R. I-4075, ¶¶ 10–11 (discussing the
E.C.J.’s role as an “autonomous” interpreter of Brussels I as necessary to ensure uniform
standards of application).
138. See, e.g., Cass. 1e civ., July 16, 1998, R.C.D.I.P. 1999, 122, note Bertrand Ancel &
Horatia Muir Watt (applying its own interpretation of the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for International Sale of Goods, supra note 21, to a classic “battle of the forms”
situation and striking the contradictory forum selection clauses in contract documents, instead
of attempting to apply a rule derived from Brussels I Article 17). Bernard notes that “many
scholars” agree that FSA validity must be examined under “independent European rules”
emanating from E.C.J. jurisprudence, but that in the absence or perceived inadequacy of those
“rules,” national courts are likely to apply their own rules. Bernard, supra note 102, at 316, 323.
139. Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, Oct. 31, 1951, art. 1, 15
U.S.T. 2228, 2228, 220 U.N.T.S. 121, 121 (entered into force July 15, 1955).
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implementing the New York Convention,140 which regulates the
validity and enforceability of international arbitration agreements,
illustrates the potential pitfalls of concluding an FSA convention
whose provisions of formal validity are inadequately articulated.141
The New York Convention requires that an international arbitration
agreement be “in writing.”142 It further specifies that formally
adequate writings “shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an
arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an
exchange of letters or telegrams.”143 This sparing definition of an
adequate “agreement in writing” has created considerable
interpretive confusion within the United States federal court system.
Most prominently, two circuit courts of appeals have arrived at
opposite conclusions regarding whether an arbitration clause in an
unsigned but otherwise accepted contract is an enforceable
“agreement in writing.”144
140. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention].
141. The New York Convention has been characterized as “one of the major contributing
factors to the rapid development of arbitration as a means of resolving international trade
disputes,” and “one of the more fruitful efforts of its type.” JACK C. COE, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: AMERICAN PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE IN A GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE 62 (1997) (quoting A. Redfern & M. Hunter, LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 63 (2d ed. 1991)). The New York Convention,
which has now been adopted by approximately one hundred states, serves two general
functions: it requires the courts of adhering states to decline to exercise jurisdiction over matters
covered by a valid arbitration agreement, and it requires adhering states to recognize and
enforce arbitral awards. Id. at 61. The Convention has been implemented in the United States as
chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208 (2000), where it has had
the practical effect of extending the FAA’s favorable treatment of arbitration clauses to certain
international arbitration agreements previously outside the scope of the FAA, such as
arbitration agreements involving purely non-United States transactions and arbitration
agreements naming a situs outside of the United States. COE, supra, at 127.
142. New York Convention, supra note 141, § II(1).
143. Id. § II(2). Curiously, the United States implementing legislation fails to include the
New York Convention’s “agreement in writing” provision. United States courts have
nevertheless concluded that the provision should apply. Susan L. Karamanian, The Road to the
Tribunal and Beyond: International Commercial Arbitration and United States Courts, 34 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 17, 63–64 (2002).
144. Sphere Drake Ins. PLC v. Marine Towing, Inc., 16 F.3d 666, 669–70 (5th Cir. 1994)
(holding that an international arbitration agreement in an unsigned contract was an “agreement
in writing” under the New York Convention); see also Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815
F.2d 840, 845–46 (2d Cir. 1987) (using prior course of dealing to enforce an unsigned arbitration
agreement on the back of an order confirmation). But see Kahn Lucas Lancaster, Inc. v. Lark
Int’l Ltd., 186 F.3d 210, 217–18 (2d Cir. 1999) (criticizing the Sphere Drake decision and holding
that an arbitration agreement contained in an unsigned purchase order was not an enforceable
“agreement in writing” under the New York Convention).
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Courts have also struggled to identify the kinds and quantities of
“exchanged letters or telegrams” sufficient to satisfy the New York
Convention’s “writing” requirement.145 At least one court has
interpreted the New York Convention as permitting the imposition of
additional requirements of formal validity—specifically, the formal
requirements of the state statute of frauds.146 These problems have led
to a call for new federal legislation clarifying the (United States’s)
interpretation of the New York Convention’s “writing” provisions
and harmonizing the United States’ application of the treaty with its
application by other New York Convention members.147 As one
Chinese scholar has observed, the New York Convention’s written
form requirements are both too strict and too imprecise: the
Convention’s “strict written form requirement . . . has not kept pace
with current international commercial practice,” nor is it “precise”
enough to prevent a “variety” of divergent opinions regarding the
formal sufficiency of unsigned arbitration agreements.148
C. Suggestions for a Model FSA Convention
The United States’ experience with the New York Convention
and the European Union’s experience with Brussels I and its
successor regulation indicate that Hague Conference delegates should
abandon the current model for conditions of formal validity. Instead,
Conference delegates should pursue a more flexible approach that
nevertheless unambiguously promotes the underlying goal of all such
formal conditions: the assurance of the parties’ consent to the FSA.
145. Compare Chloe Z Fishing Co. v. Odyssey Re (London) Ltd., 109 F. Supp. 2d 1236,
1248, 1250–51 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that the parties had concluded a valid “agreement in
writing” when the arbitration clause was included in the insurance broker’s “General Terms and
Policy Conditions,” even though the terms and conditions were only referenced generally in an
exchange of documents), with Bothell v. Hitachi Zosen Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1052–53
(W.D. Wash. 2000) (finding that an arbitration agreement contained in generally referenced
conditions of sale was not an “agreement in writing” absent proof that the conditions had been
mailed to the party against whom enforcement was sought). United States courts appear more
likely to enforce an arbitration agreement incorporated into an exchanged “letter” by a global
reference to general conditions of sale when the referenced conditions of sale are physically
included with the “letter.” See Astor Chocolate Corp. v. Mikroverk, Ltd., 704 F. Supp. 30, 32, 34
(E.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that an international arbitration agreement contained in general
conditions of sale referenced in and attached to a sales confirmation letter was a valid
“agreement in writing”).
146. See Sen Mar, Inc. v. Tiger Petroleum Corp., 774 F. Supp. 879, 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
147. Karamanian, supra note 143, at 74–75.
148. Jing Wang, International Judicial Practice and the Written Form Requirement for
International Arbitration Agreements, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 375, 379–81 (2001).
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This Note proposes original model provisions that illustrate one
possible approach.149 The consent-oriented model reflects commercial
realities by recognizing that a “form” is adequate if available written
evidence and the context of the parties’ relationship indicate party
consent to an FSA. At the same time, the approach goes beyond the
current U.S. common law standards by providing explicit assurances
that FSAs will not be enforced absent sufficient formal proof of party
consent.150 The level of detail in this Note’s suggested model
provisions further attempts to assure their uniform interpretation
cross-nationally.
Forms in Which a Forum Selection Agreement
Must Be Made (Formal Validity)
(1) A forum selection agreement is not valid as to form unless the
parties to the agreement consented to enter into such an agreement.
Unlike Brussels II,151 Provision (1) states explicitly that the
purpose of formal conditions of validity is to assure the reality of
party consent. Although Brussels II provides a rigid framework of
four separate valid “forms” in which an FSA may be concluded,152
Provision (1) provides needed flexibility by suggesting that the key to
an FSA’s formal validity is not strict compliance with a predetermined
“form,” but whether the “form” actually used is sufficient to indicate
consent. At the same time, the provision plays a protective role by
assuring that technical compliance with a permitted “form” will not
assure formal validity absent actual consent.
(2) Conditions of formal validity are laws or rules of a general
nature that require specific outward manifestations of consent to enter a
forum selection agreement.
Unlike Brussels II, which offers no autonomous definition of
“conditions of formal validity,” Provision (2) explicitly defines the
concept. The definition accords with the concept as used in the Rome
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations153 and
in European scholarship.154 By providing an autonomous definition of
149. A full-fledged FSA convention would need to address a host of issues besides those
addressed below, including, inter alia, rules for lis pendens recognition and enforcement.  Such
issues are beyond the scope of this Note.
150. See supra Part II.A.
151. See supra Part II.B.
152. See supra Part II.B.
153. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, June 19, 1980, 1980 O.J.
(L 266) 1, 19 I.L.M. 1492 (1980).
154. See supra note 14.
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“formal validity,” the provision promotes uniform interpretation
across jurisdictions.155 Such a definition is especially needed from the
perspective of United States jurisprudence, which rarely explicitly
analyzes FSA validity in terms of “formal” requirements.156
(3) Member States shall not establish additional conditions of
formal validity beyond those contained in this Convention.
Provision (3) emphasizes that member states may not impose
additional formal requirements beyond those established in the FSA
Convention. European157 and United States158 jurisprudence indicates
that absent such language, lower courts are tempted to impose
additional conditions under local law that may unduly restrict party
autonomy to conclude FSAs.
(4) The parties’ expression of consent to the forum selection
agreement may, but need not, be separate from their expression of
consent to enter into the underlying legal relationship.
Provision (4) serves two functions. First, it admits that an FSA
may be formally valid when it is contained in an underlying contract
to which the parties have indicated their acceptance as a whole, but
when they have not made an acceptance of the FSA specifically (such
as, for example, by initialing the FSA clause itself). The provision
may be useful in preventing excessive requirements of separate
acceptances in states whose domestic laws are relatively hostile to
FSAs.159
Second, and more importantly, the provision allows parties to
indicate consent after entering into the underlying legal relationship—
for example, through postcontractual confirmations or through course
155. See Part III.A, supra, for a discussion of the problem of assuring uniform interpretation
absent a supranational interpretive body.
156. See supra Part II.A.
157. For example, the E.C.J. found it necessary early in its Brussels I jurisprudence to clarify
that “contracting states are not free to lay down formal requirements other than those contained
in the convention.” Case 150/80, Elefanten Schuh GmbH v. Jacqmain, 1981 E.C.R. 1671, ¶ 26.
158. Sen Mar, Inc. v. Tiger Petroleum Corp., 774 F. Supp. 879, 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(applying a state statute of frauds in addition to the New York Convention’s formal
requirement of an “agreement in writing”).
159. For example, the French Cour de Cassation, applying French FSA law, held that an
FSA contained on the back of a maritime transport bill of lading would not bind the receiver of
the transported goods unless the receiver made a “special acceptance” of the FSA beyond
signing the front of the bill of lading and writing “accompli” (“fulfilled”). Cass. com., Dec. 8,
1998, R.C.D.I.P. 1999, 536, at 537, note Etienne Pataut. The ruling appears to establish a stricter
regime for FSAs contained on bills of lading than for other kinds of FSAs.
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of dealing. The New York Convention contains a similar provision.160
The author’s provision serves a function similar to the one served by
the “evidenced in writing” provision of Brussels II by allowing parties
to fill in the details of an earlier agreement with subsequent
documentation, such as postcontract confirmations.161 However, the
provision is more flexible because it allows postcontractual
acceptances of an FSA even when the parties have not previously
concluded an “oral agreement” that “expressly relates” to the FSA.162
(5) A forum selection agreement shall not be valid without some
written evidence of that agreement. “Written evidence” shall include
communications by electronic or any other modern means that provide
a durable record of the communication.
Provision (5) functions as a mild “statute of frauds”—that is, to
prevent fraudulent assertions that the parties entered into a purely
oral FSA—by requiring at least some written evidence of that
agreement. This provision accords generally with commercial
practice, in which there will almost always be at least some written
evidence of an FSA.163 This provision differs from Brussels II’s
approach to “writing,”164 however, by explicitly emphasizing that the
role of “writing” is evidentiary, and that an “agreement in writing” is
not a “form” whose validity is determined separate from the context
of the parties’ relationship.
Nevertheless, the provision follows Brussels II by defining
“written evidence” broadly to include “electronic or any other
modern means” of communication.165 Such a provision is necessary to
assure that national courts do not unduly restrict modern commercial
practice, in which parties often fail to memorialize agreements with
pen and paper.166
160. See New York Convention, supra note 139, § II(2) (establishing that formally adequate
writings “shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the
parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams”).
161. See supra Part II.B.2.
162. See supra Part II.B.2.
163. See supra Part II.A.
164. See supra Part II.A.1.
165. See Brussels II, supra note 3, art. 23.2 (“Any communication by electronic means which
provides a durable record of the agreement shall be equivalent to ‘writing’) .
166. Jing Wang notes that when the New York Convention was drafted in 1958,
communication technology was considered only to the extent of permitting letters
and telegrams to satisfy the written form requirement, and little space was left for
filling the gap of progress in technology. With recent progress in technology and
commercial activities, more and more businessmen choose to carry on their
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(6) In determining the sufficiency of written evidence of a forum
selection agreement, the seised court shall consider:
(a) practices which the parties have established between themselves
over the course of a continuing business relationship (prior course of
dealing).
(b) practices that are regularly observed by parties to contracts of
the same type concerned and who are involved in the same branch of
commerce concerned, and of which the parties were or ought to have
been aware (trade usage).
Provision (6) follows Brussels II in recognizing that prior course
of dealing and trade usage may determine the formal validity of an
FSA.167 To fail to include such allowances for prior course of dealing
and trade usage would represent a serious setback for commercial
contract law, which by now has largely shaken off the transaction-
inhibiting formalism of an earlier era.168
However, the provision replaces the somewhat ambiguous term
“usage,” itself a poor translation of the French term “habitudes,” with
terms more familiar to United States jurisprudence: “practices” and
“prior course of dealing.” The provision also departs from Brussels II
by specifying that prior course of dealing and trade usage are not
separate “forms,” but rather serve to determine whether given
written evidence is sufficient to indicate actual consent.
(7) Written and other evidence must indicate that the parties had
or should have had knowledge of the forum selection agreement at the
time of formation of the underlying legal relationship, unless the forum
selection agreement was concluded as a separate agreement subject to a
separate acceptance indicating real consent.
Provision (7) prevents unfair surprise by emphasizing that the
parties must know that the contract contains an FSA at the time they
enter into the contract. European jurisprudence demonstrates a real
danger of unfair surprise, as parties may insert nonobvious or illegible
FSAs deep inside extracontractual documents.169 Evidence of actual
transactions through less traditional measures that are inconsistent with the strict
meaning of [New York Convention] Article II (2), such as telex, facsimile, and e-mail.
Wang, supra note 148, at 380.
167. See supra Part II.B.3–4.
168. See, e.g., Wang, supra note 148, at 381 (critiquing the New York Convention for failing
to address the validity of FSAs “formed orally or tacitly . . . as they are in the ordinary
commercial transactions” and noting that the “written form requirement of arbitration
agreements is being challenged by the new commercial customs and technologies”).
169. See supra Part II.B.1.
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knowledge of an FSA at the time of contracting, absent a subsequent,
separate acceptance of the FSA, is essential to assure the reality of
the parties’ consent. However, the provision also leaves open the
possibility that the parties may decide to modify their earlier legal
relationship by entering into a post-formation FSA—something that
Brussels II only implicitly permits.170
(8) A forum selection agreement shall be presumed to be exclusive
absent clear evidence of a contrary intent.
Provision (8) follows Brussels II in establishing a rebuttable
presumption of exclusivity.171 The words “absent clear evidence of a
contrary intent” are added to discourage the excessive formalism that
United States federal courts exhibit when interpreting the exclusivity
of “jurisdiction,” as opposed to “venue,” selection agreements.172
CONCLUSION
This Note’s discussion indicates that European and United States
law generally agree that international B2B FSAs are enforceable in
principle. This convergence suggests that the Hague Conference
delegates may be able to salvage at least a portion of their work on
the Judgments Convention by adopting a narrower FSA convention.
A downsizing of the Conference’s initial expectations should not be
viewed as a failure. Instead, an international FSA convention
promises to increase the efficiency of international commerce by
assuring uniform, predictable enforcement of the informed
jurisdictional choices of commercial actors.173
The model provisions detailed in Part III provide an alternative
framework to the European model that Hague Conference delegates
have so far pursued. This alternative framework reflects modern-day
commercial realities by recognizing that a “form” is adequate if
available evidence and the context of the parties’ relationship indicate
actual consent to an FSA. The framework combines this needed
170. See supra Part II.B.2 (noting that Brussels II’s form of an agreement “evidenced in
writing” requires that the earlier “agreement” have related specifically to the FSA).
171. Article 23.1 of Brussels II, supra note 3, establishes that “jurisdiction shall be exclusive
unless the parties have agreed otherwise.”
172. See supra Part II.A.
173. FSAs are of widely recognized value in international commerce, as they “enhance
political and procedural neutrality,” Park, supra note 10, at 20, and promote “orderliness and
predictability in contractual relationships,” Michael E. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and
the Privatization of Procedure, 25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 51, 52 (1992).
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flexibility with a high level of detail that will help assure uniform
interpretation cross-nationally.
